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Figure 1: A hole in the wall – Israel’s security wall near Bethlehem, September 2005 (source: Richard 
Schofield)  
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Figure 1: A hole in the wall – Israel’s security wall near Bethlehem, September 2005 (source: Richard 
Schofield) – mentioned on p: 8 of draft m/s  
Figure 2: The Saudi-Yemeni borderlands and the agreement of June 2000 (source: Richard Schofield) 
– mentioned on p: 18 of draft m/s 
Figure 3a: Laying down the Perso-Ottoman boundary in stone: Hubbard’s ‘confidence’ (source: 
reproduced with kind permission from G.E. Hubbard, From the Gulf to Ararat: Imperial Boundary 
Making in the Late Ottoman Empire (London: I.B. Tauris 2016) – mentioned on p: 18 of draft m/s 
Figure 3b: Laying down the Perso-Ottoman boundary in stone: Hubbard’s ‘doubt’ (reproduced with 
kind permission from G.E. Hubbard, From the Gulf to Ararat: Imperial Boundary Making in the Late 
Ottoman Empire (London: I.B. Tauris 2016) – mentioned on p: 18 of draft m/s 
Figure 3c: Laying down the Perso-Ottoman boundary in stone: Hubbard’s ‘confusion’ (reproduced 
with kind permission from G.E. Hubbard, From the Gulf to Ararat: Imperial Boundary Making in the 
Late Ottoman Empire (London: I.B. Tauris 2016) – mentioned on p: 18 of draft m/s 
Figure 4: The Iran-Iraq boundary after the June 1975 river boundary protocol (source: reproduced 
with kind permission from U.S. Department of State International Boundary Study 164: Iran-Iraq 
Boundary) – mentioned on p: 20 of draft m/s 
Figure 5: Sketch map anticipating the bizarre 1974 Saudi-Abu Dhabi (UAE) boundary agreement 
(source: reproduced with kind permission from R. Schofield (ed.) Arabian Boundaries, 1966-1975 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Archive Editions [Cambridge University Press], 2009), 15, p. 234 – mentioned 
on p: 23 of draft m/s 
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International Boundaries and Borderlands in the Middle East: Balancing 
Context, Exceptionalism and Representation  
Abstract 
Renewed academic interest in the Middle Eastern border is inevitable with the 
marked increase in fortified territorial limits across the region and the 
appearance of new borderland spatialities in the sovereign margins of the war-
torn Iraqi, Syrian and Yemeni states.  If the consequent spectacle of displaced 
populations confronting state power at the international boundary seems a 
defining image, this article concentrates on two other dominant, less 
publicised but still relevant border representations from the recent past: 
territorial definition and its deterministic association with conflict in the 
northern Gulf and the resource-driven finalisation of the peninsula’s territorial 
framework.  This follows consideration of the significance of the borderland in 
the region.  The author reflects back here on a long record of research into 
these issues and argues that all of these contexts must be acknowledged in any 
balanced appraisal of the Middle Eastern border.  The article comments on the 
challenge of extending regional approaches to the study of borders and – on 
the centenary of the infamous 1916 Sykes-Picot treaty - acknowledges that the 
Middle East region’s experience of international boundaries continues to be 
depicted as exceptional.  Unsurprisingly, it will conclude that there is no one 
typical Middle Eastern border.        
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APPRAISING MIDDLE EASTERN BORDERS AND BORDERLANDS 
State borders and borderlands in the Middle East have recently been 
preoccupying the international community, featuring prominently in popular 
Western media depictions and attracting increasing levels of scrutiny from 
academia.  At least visually, the current confrontation between vulnerable, 
displaced populations and state power at fortified state limits (De Genova’s 
‘border spectacle’1) might well appear to define the international boundary 
in popular terms – an encounter experienced by migrants and refugees both 
in the region and further afield.   
Broadening our spatial focus to borderlands, the crucial backcloth in the 
staging of such dramas has, of course, been the successive collapse in the 
sovereign reach of the Iraqi and Syrian states over the last one and a half 
decades and the appearance of autonomous political actors in (and across) 
their margins.  Often referred to as stateless spaces in their better known 
(and earlier established) African context, a developing concentration on 
what Goodhand (2008) has termed the ‘places in between’ within regional 
conflict systems explains security studies increasing concerns with Middle 
Eastern borderlands.2   Such profound change in border status and 
borderland security has also coincided with the centenary of the infamous 
Anglo-French arrangements struck during the First World War to 
foreshadow the new framework of mandated state territories that would 
come into being to replace the Ottoman Middle East at the turn of the 
1920s.3   This has occasioned many to ponder whether the Sykes-Picot 
‘territorial system’ has had its day and whether things might not have been 
done differently in the first instance.4   Certainly the possibility that the 
borders of the Middle East have changed or are changing is out there.   
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This all seemingly provides fertile grounds for a reenergised academic 
engagement with Middle Eastern territorial questions, reflected in no small 
way by the appearance of this special issue of Geopolitics but also, already, 
by other special issues of journals that hadn’t displayed a huge interest in 
such themes in recent decades.5  Extending a more critical approach to the 
study of borders and territoriality chimes with claims that since the Arab 
Spring and its tumultuous aftermath “Middle Eastern studies has been 
undergoing a quiet revolution [with] a heightened level of reflection on 
theoretical models, concepts and methodologies”.6   In this brave new 
world, authoritarianism and protest movements have been debated more 
freely, while updated critiques of nationalism have allowed human 
mobilities and transnationalism to be interrogated from fresh angles.  
Importantly, too, Middle Eastern studies seems to be breaking out of what 
some have perceived to be a regional straightjacket in the fields of political 
economy and history, as research is increasingly framed internationally and 
globally.7  Can the same be done for coverage of territorial questions?  
With its declaredly critical focus on socio-spatial process and its commitment 
to ethics and social justice, geography’s vogue border studies approach 
seeks to identify the production of borders at various levels and scales – 
from the individual body to inter-state level.8 Given such proclivities, it will 
naturally be drawn to how intensifying fence and wall construction along 
borders within the region imposes concentrated restraints on human 
mobility – and on the itinerant processes of walling, bordering and othering.  
Here, it won’t be short of case-study material with more such constructions 
having gone up in the Middle East than any other region in recent times.9    
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But, in the words of seasoned international boundary observer Michel 
Foucher during June 2017, “aren’t borders about more than just fences and 
migration?”10  To which this author would reply yes, pointedly so for the 
region under review here.  The spectacle of vulnerable human groups 
meeting state authority at international boundary fences, like the pertaining 
notion that the inherited colonial framework has reached its sell-by date, is a 
dominant contemporary image but is just that.  The same goes for those 
seemingly widening and insecure borderland spaces.  These are only the 
latest of many valid and varied Middle Eastern border representations and 
contexts of recent times and many others (despite being typically identified 
with earlier points of time) remain relevant to varying degrees across the 
region.  Here we are talking about: an association between disputed 
territorial definition and conflict (northern Gulf); the resource driven 
finalisation of the political map on land and sea (Arabia and the waters of 
the Gulf and Eastern Mediterranean) and; the adoption of territorial 
disputes as symbols of inter-state and sub-regional rivalry (island 
sovereignty disputes).    
Just as these contexts are still with us, the appearance of border fences is 
not particularly new and the inadequacies of the colonial territorial 
framework have long been apparent.  The main argument of this article, 
therefore, is that we shouldn’t be falling into the trap of thinking there is a 
typical Middle Eastern boundary or borderland, however tempting it may be 
for the application of vogue methodological and theoretical academic 
approaches.  As within any other region, there is considerable variety in the 
type, scale and intensity of territorial challenges that are being confronted.  
All of these contexts and processes need to be understood as complex and 
dynamic and as existing alongside one another– even if some (like 
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continuing questions over state sovereignty, delimitation and demarcation) 
appear rather old-hat and mundane.  The author reflects back here on 
researching Middle Eastern borders and borderlands extensively over the 
last three decades, with a concentration on his main areas of expertise - 
Iraq, Iran, Arabia and the Persian Gulf. 
In tackling the issues and arguments just noted, this article adopts the 
following structure.  Firstly, we summarise how ideas have moved in 
geography and the social sciences to cover boundaries and borderlands and 
the challenge of applying these at the regional level. Secondly, we 
selectively review claims made over the years and decades by scholars that 
suggest the Middle Eastern (or, indeed, the Arabian) border should be 
regarded as exceptional, simultaneously charting the Anglophone 
geographical tradition of covering the international boundary in the region.  
Having commented upon the exaggerated attention that has been placed 
upon the 1916 Sykes-Picot treaty on its centenary, we then turn our 
attention to borderlands in the third section of this article.   
While not many borderlands can be deemed to have existed in a traditional 
sense, there is a need to better appreciate how the margins of the state 
have functioned at their various levels of operation - materially and 
historically.   Our case-study here is the region’s classic historical borderland, 
the Perso-Ottoman frontier zone.   In a fourth and final main section, 
successive representations of international boundaries are explored in an 
Arabian context from the 1980s forwards – here we respectively treat 
territorial definition and its deterministic association with conflict in the 
northern Gulf, the resource-driven finalisation of the Arabian territorial 
framework and then putting up border fences.  Such a progression from 
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destabilising international boundary disputes, through finalising their status 
and alignment to marking them down on the ground may seem quite linear 
and logical for such a youthful political region, where many states only got 
their independence from Britain as recently as 1971. Yet the point here and a 
central message of the article as a whole is that these representations can’t 
simply be signed off to specific time periods.  Though they vary in intensity, 
they continue to be valid and present across the region and need to be fully 
acknowledged in any balanced appraisal of the Middle Eastern border.  
 
THE CHALLENGE OF EXTENDING STUDIES TO A REGIONAL CONTEXT 
Whichever region is being considered, there will always be a notable 
concentration on those individual territorial limits or disputes that are in the 
news – particularly within the context of conflict, as they temporarily 
become of interest to a wider constituency than geography or regional 
studies. The tendency towards individual coverage is reinforced by a long-
observed ‘unique case’ syndrome within academic study that needs to be 
confronted when attempting to place borders and borderlands into 
comparative context.   Political geographers have always commented that 
there is much to be gained from examining the evolution of individual 
international boundaries in the surrounding human and physical contexts of 
their borderlands, by writing their biography as such11  – here, seemingly 
taking their cue, at least in part, from Stephen Jones’ famous old caution: 
‘each boundary is almost unique and therefore many generalisations are of 
doubtful validity’.12  
Such is the diversity of border-related concerns and territorial issues across 
the Middle East, that they are usually subjected to suitably multidisciplinary 
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(generally historical, geographical and legal) treatments within edited multi-
author collections.13   There are almost certainly more single-author 
overviews of sub-regional territorial concerns out there than for the Middle 
East and North Africa as a whole – one thinks here of our main focus here - 
the Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf region - where so much has been written 
about international boundaries and territorial disputes in the last few 
decades that a recent historiographic survey devotes a whole section to 
‘boundaries and legal matters’.14  On the face of it, the Arabian Peninsula has 
much that ties it together in territorial terms -  regional geopolitics that were 
characterised historically by a resource-poor, arid environment and sparse 
but mobile population levels, then its subjection to Britain’s desert-boundary 
drawing as its protégé statelets were given a size and shape in the 
developing context of its huge hydrocarbons endowment. 15  Research into 
Arabian boundary-making has, of course, been facilitated greatly by the 
easily accessible British governmental primary record at Kew (The National 
Archives) and St.Pancras (India Office Records at the British Library).16  
This special issue of Geopolitics seeks, on the face of it, to begin extending 
the critical concerns of geography’s vogue prism of border studies to the 
regional application of the Middle East.  As has been established, the 
collapse of the sovereign reach of the state, the resultant human suffering 
and displacement, combined with increased securitisation and fortification 
of inter-state limits provides much to mull over.  Border studies has been 
much lauded for its perceptive critiques of the bounding and bordering 
process (including, most recently, Amilhat-Szary’s notion of borderity)17 and 
its theorisation of the spatial workings and manifestations of power.18  It has 
prided itself in developing explicitly non-state-centric approaches – 
addressing the long-harboured criticism that geography traditionally 
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concerned itself only with the international scale in covering boundaries and 
territory.19   
Exploring how distinct spaces are produced and reproduced by the 
enforcement, observation and negotiation of borders at various levels (and 
also how the reverse obtains in revealing how space management produces 
new operative borders) has been a significant concern.20  In this vein, recent 
research of emergent borders of identity and allegiance in a conflictual 
urban context has continued the rich tradition of studying the spatial and 
societal divisions of the major cities of the Eastern Mediterranean.21  Moving 
slightly further south, it should not surprise that the most written about 
Middle Eastern territorial dispute has been singled out for critical treatment. 
There have been various studies of the various spatial impacts and the large-
scale and localised meanings of Israel’s security wall (see Figure 1)22, while the 
continued expansion of Israeli settlements on Palestinian territory is 
reflected in a deepening geographical engagement with settler colonial 
studies.23 
If these efforts square with contemporary geography’s re-energised missive 
to “gauge how borders are confronted, experienced and negotiated”,24  
then border studies sometimes seems to have moved too far away from 
geography’s traditional scalar concern with international boundaries.25  
After all, the reality by which the world is fundamentally compartmentalised 
into sovereign state territorial units is not going to change any time soon.26 
This position has been acknowledged with some prominent recent efforts 
to rehabilitate the legitimacy of the international boundary within 
geography – Megoran’s imaginative call for more border biographies comes 
to mind here, as does Reece Jones resourceful inventory of state practices 
Page 16 of 41
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fgeo  Email: geopolitics@uva.nl  and geopolitics@usu.edu
Geopolitics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
GEOPOLITICS   International Boundaries and Borderlands in the Middle East 
9 
 
at the contemporary securitised border.27  Others have called for an overall 
rebalancing of contemporary border studies, when recognising it as a 
commendably energised if slightly unwieldy field of study.28   
This rebalancing of geography’s current territorial concerns might usefully 
extend to a generally ignored maritime dimension but also, in this author’s 
opinion, to reengaging more substantively with international boundary 
disputes.  Disputes over territorial definition and an international boundary’s 
provenance, alignment and status remain a huge area of preoccupation in 
the Middle East and North Africa.  Kelly has observed that deterministic 
concerns such as relative state positioning remain a live issue in inter-state 
disputes and domestic political discourses29.   Given that this is observable in 
the region, we might also pause to consider what contemporary geopolitics 
and border studies have recently had to offer in critiquing boundary and 
territorial disputes.  In many ways, this comes across as restating the 
obvious.   
In demonstrating that the analysis of any regional crisis must begin by 
acknowledging the essential messiness of the local, Toal has offered a 
blueprint for what the critical geopolitics of any territorial dispute might 
look like.  This covers its legal and historical aspects, characterises its 
variegated dynamics at the regional and international levels but also reveals 
the workings of power through identifying vested interests and agency. 30  
In related vein, Brunet-Jailly has recently tried to breathe life into the old 
boundary dispute classification originally developed by veteran boundary 
geographer Victor Prescott in the mid-1960s which distinguishes between 
territorial, positional, functional and resource dimensions as their primary 
drivers.31   This may all seem rather basic but surely goes to underline that 
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contemporary border studies has gone a little too far in eschewing 
traditional (and what it sees as outmoded) geographical territorial concerns.  
It is in the same spirit of rebalancing our coverage that this author has called 
for more explicitly multidisciplinary approaches that “link the contemporary 
legal and technical status of disputes more closely with their historical and 
political drivers…within the context of their own complex geographies.”32  
 
THE EXCEPTIONAL MIDDLE EASTERN BORDER? 
As with other trappings and trimmings of the Middle Eastern state system, 
the theme of regional exceptionalism has always been around when 
discussing international boundaries.  Within regional and political studies 
more broadly, academics have been long been arguing for the development 
of comparative and theoretical frameworks that relegate a distinct 
treatment for the Middle East that is essentially orientalist in its tone and 
origins.33  In geography, the related notion that a unique Middle Eastern city 
could ever have existed has been pretty much dismissed for the best part of 
four decades now.34   Where boundaries and territory are concerned, 
regional exceptionalism has been made principally for two reasons.    Firstly, 
Islamic notions of sovereignty were communal rather than territorial, 
supposedly rendering the European state model with its fixed borders 
unsuitable for (and alien to) traditional modes of social and spatial 
organisation35.  Secondly, nomadism was prevalent in many of the more arid 
areas of the Middle East - here tribal territories expanded and contracted 
with the availability of resources as, if you like, an early form of mobile 
borders was witnessed.  Traditional Arabian geopolitics, for instance, 
dictated that mobility was the key to survival – the scarcer resources were, 
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the further people had to travel to gather them, reflected in the size of 
respective dirah (tribal grazing grounds).36   
Much political use has been made out of the first observation. Erasing the 
colonial boundaries that truncate the region from Morocco to Muscat so as 
to integrate the region’s community of believers within a putative singular 
state has been an important tenet of Arab nationalism.37  Similarly, some of 
the Arab world’s most charismatic political personalities have engaged 
colourfully with the language of regional exceptionalism in highlighting the 
alien provenance of fixed territorial borders – though some, as we’ll 
witness, haven’t always been very consistent here.  For instance, in 
commenting that Iraq’s borders stop at Kuwait City and Kuwait’s at 
Baghdad during a relatively passive phase in their long running boundary 
dispute during the early 1980s, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was 
borrowing from an analogy made by Ibn Saud in the early 1920s.38    
With respect to the second observation here, there may have been a 
tendency to simplify, even caricature nomadic mobilities.  Britain’s former 
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Sir Rupert Hay would liken the Arabian 
desert to an area of high seas, over which nomads and their camels roamed 
at will.39  As Braudel would comment, such reductionist views only held up 
when you were looking in from the outside – whereas, from the inside, 
desert societies would soon reveal their “complicated organisations, 
hierarchies, customs and astonishing legal structures”.40 Portraying Hay’s 
views as typical of Britain’s traditional geographical coverage with its 
explicit colonial connections would, however, be slightly disingenuous.  Sure 
enough, the sizeable literature on traditional territorial organisation and 
boundary-drawing that was originally contributed by travellers, explorers, 
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diplomats and those serving on imperial commissions helped perpetuate 
many of the arguments for seeing the Middle East as broadly exceptional.  
These views often found their expression through the Royal Geographical 
Society and its publications.  While certain commentaries could come across 
as slightly orientalist in tone when portraying the inhospitability, 
remoteness and sickliness of far-flung borderland localities,41 there can be 
little doubting the great value of such a legacy in establishing the bases of 
colonial territorialities.  For instance, the ruminations of famous travellers 
like Thesiger and independently-minded diplomats such as Ingrams would 
inform Britain’s understanding of the social and spatial organisation of 
southern Arabia. 42 Not before time, greater recognition is also being lent to 
the reflections of this most t aditional group of commentators on the 
boundary-making process – sometimes they were far more considered, dare 
one say critical, than is often assumed.  Just take a look at Hubbard’s 
imaginative captioning (“confidence, doubt and confusion”) of a sequence 
of photographs grappling with the challenge of reconciling a Perso-Ottoman 
boundary delimitation to features on the ground on the eve of the First 
World War (see Figure 2a-c).43  
To generalise somewhat, the perception that international boundaries in the 
region were exceptional would fade with decolonisation as the same broad 
problems of adjusting to the colonial territorial framework was faced by the 
postcolonial state across the globe. There seemed much in Drysdale and 
Blake’s observation that “[t]he political spheres they [international 
boundaries] define have acquired a seeming permanence, and the state 
constitutes as basic, legitimate and universal a unit of political geographic 
organisation in the Middle East and North Africa as elsewhere”.44   It was 
noteworthy that this clear, anti-exceptionalist statement was emanating 
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(certainly where Blake was concerned) from the influential Middle East 
regional geography school established at Durham in the post-WW2 years.   It 
remains the case that there is no equivalent region or continent-wide 
commitment in the Middle East to retaining the territorial limits inherited 
from the colonial period that is in place for Latin America and Africa with the 
institutionalised acceptance of the legal principle of uti possidetis juris.  Yet, 
even one of the most radical proponents of territorial revisionism in the 
Arab World – Libya’s Gaddafi – ultimately proved a pragmatic statist.  Having 
called during the 1970s and 1980s for the establishment of state mergers on 
a variety of anti-colonial premises, the Libyan state would allow for its 
maritime boundaries with Tunisia and Malta to be adjudicated at the 
International Court of Justice in The Hague.   It would do the same with its 
land boundary with Chad early in the next decade – pushing once again for a 
maximal territorial state definition.45 
Yet, there is always a danger of generalising across the Middle East – 
highlighted by another British Geographer, John Wilkinson, at the turn of 
the 1990s.  He would postulate that “[n]ot one of the states of the Arabian 
Peninsula recognised by the international community... could put up a 
watertight case to the International Court at the Hague to retain the 
territory it actually occupies”46.  Wilkinson was representative, if you like, of 
a third but smaller geographic tradition - regional Arabists who had spent 
much of their careers in the region and whose research had a more obvious 
ethnographic bent.  Making the case for sub-regional exceptionalism, he 
pointed to the tendency for even recently-signed Arabian boundary treaty 
texts to remain largely secret and the failure of state signatories to process 
such agreements in the manner the international legal community has come 
to expect.  Wilkinson’s comment coincided with Iraq’s invasion (and 
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attempted annexation) of Kuwait and the significant regional insecurities it 
fostered.   By the end of the 1990s, the Arabian states had done much to 
redress this position – entrenching territorial definition in the pragmatic 
context of accelerated resource development47.  As for the resolution of the 
Kuwait crisis, the argument would be made quite openly that it was 
exceptional circumstances that were demanding exceptional measures, so 
the UN Secretary-General himself made arrangements for the finalisation of 
this international boundary on the ground, whose inviolability was 
guaranteed by the Security Council.48   
Let’s now fast-forward to the current (post-2011 Arab Spring) context of 
perceived territorial change in the region, of newly-emergent state and non-
state spatialities that has sharply refocused attention on the Middle Eastern 
border and its relationship with human mobility.   To a degree, the 
impression is being given that the international community is ultimately 
prepared to sanction more change to the existing territorial framework here 
than it is elsewhere – most obviously when compared to the West’s 
unflinching stance over Ukrainian territorial integrity following the Russian 
annexation of Crimea early in 2014.  The case for making a change to the 
territorial framework of the eastern Mediterranean has been reinforced by 
uncritical representations of the 1916 Sykes-Picot correspondence on its 
centenary.    
Thankfully, even from popular sources, there has been a discernible 
backlash against such representations with Time magazine carrying the 
following headline in May 2016 - “Sykes-Picot: the centenary of a deal that 
did not shape the Middle East”49. It should never be forgotten that Britain, 
from the start, was aware of the potential problems it was creating with the 
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various and often contradictory components of its wartime territorial deals 
– the ‘Sykes-Picot system’, if you like. Take, for instance, the comments of its 
Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour on the eve of his retirement during 
August 1919: “in short…the Powers have made no statement of fact which 
is not admittedly wrong, and no declaration of policy which, at least in the 
letter, they have not always intended to violate”.50 Here he was reflecting 
on Britain’s slim prospects of reconciling the 1915-16 Husain-McMahon 
correspondence, promising an independent Hashimite Arabian kingdom in 
return for coming in against the Ottomans during WW1, the Sykes-Picot 
exchange of letters and the November 1917 declaration of sympathy with 
Zionist aspirations for an independent homeland in Palestine that would be 
named after him51. 
Yet the Sykes –Picot treaty itself had a demonstrably limited effect – 
designating broad spheres of influence whose limits rarely coincided with 
the international boundaries that would emerge, often from further Anglo-
French deliberations, over the next decade.   While the Bolshevik revolution 
of 1917 would render the notion of a French-controlled buffer wedge of 
territory to separate imperial Russia and Britain redundant, it should be 
underlined that the basic shape and size of the state that would include 
Mosul within Iraq had been recommended by the influential De Bunsen 
Committee as early as the summer of 1915 for reasons of imperial strategy 
(protecting Mesopotamia from the north) and political economy (capturing 
its oil resources)52.  In fact, Sykes-Picot had little effect on the precise 
territorial definition of the Iraqi state – something that this author has rather 
argued was “…the product of a series of discrete regional episodes in which 
Britain was centrally involved, before and after an independent 
Mesopotamian state had ever been imagined”53.    
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The largely arbitrary nature of the Sykes-Picot carve-up has long been 
highlighted too.   The detail of boundaries ultimately laid down generally 
took account of indicators where available – a mixture of locally-observed 
separations and old Ottoman administrative divisions.   While no one could 
seriously proclaim the territorial framework that emerged in the early 1920s 
as a model outcome, it is not clear that there was necessarily a better basis 
out there for dividing the Ottoman Eastern Mediterranean into the states 
that emerged from it.54   There had been calls from plenty of influential 
people following the conclusion of Sykes-Picot that the political map be 
redrawn or at least finessed where possible to prioritise emergent regional 
realities over the old, imperial strategic mind-set.  In the same statement 
before the House that has al eady been referred to, Balfour had challenged 
Britain and France during August 1919 “…to make such international 
arrangements, economic and territorial, as will enable each region to 
develop itself to the best advantage without giving occasion for jealousies 
or disputes”.55  US President Woodrow Wilson had urged a more ‘scientific 
basis’ for future regional settlement at the Versailles Peace Conference., 
though the interesting ideas the commission he despatched to the Eastern 
Mediterranean came up were effectively still-born once Britain and France 
withdrew support.56   
So London and Paris would arrive at their own arrangements for defining 
the margins of their new proteges and none of these were more vague than 
the delimitation originally laid down to separate the mandates of Iraq and 
Syria – the line so famously discarded by ISIS in recent times when 
territorialising its trans-boundary borderland state.  For a December 1920 
Anglo-French Convention supposedly laid down a boundary between Iraq 
and Syria running for hundreds of miles in less than six lines of treaty text.   
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When asked about the most suitable location for this territorial limit two 
years earlier, Iraq’s imperial architects-in-chief, Gertrude Bell and Arnold 
Wilson quipped that, while you might patrol existing caravan routes to mark 
some sort of divide, no government would ordinarily be interested in 
extending effective control over uncultivated and unpopulated desert 
areas57.   Maybe this international boundary was more artificial than most 
therefore and that might explain why Sykes-Picot has come in for the 
treatment is has. 
 
BORDERLANDS IN THE MIDDLE EAST  
The point that boundaries as lines are a statist and legal abstract and that 
borderlands are the reality on the ground with width was made by Friedrich 
Ratzel as early as the mid-1890s.  This basic premise was developed more 
fully by two more British geographers, Minghi and House, from the 1960s, as 
they tried to foster a borderland studies approach that looked at 
transactions and flows across international boundaries in routine everyday 
settings.58  At the turn of the 1990s, the American historian Martinez then 
forwarded a four-stage evolutionary typology for borderlands, whereby 
their effective, operative width would increase as relations between 
neighbouring states improved in a context of cooperation – a schema that 
seemed more plausible in a pre-globalisation context.59  Some of the more 
recent geographic literature has concentrated on emergent complexity with 
the identification of borderscapes constituted by the layered human 
identities and power structures found within international borderlands. 
Importantly, however, borderlands have taken on a wider meaning beyond 
the usual disciplinary parameters and the assumption that their effective 
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width increases in a cooperative context of increasing inter-state 
cooperation has now been questioned.  While conflict borderlands might 
now be understood by many as the physical and societal spaces that 
straddle the international boundaries of states experiencing armed conflict 
(including civil war, insurgency and other forms of inter and intra state 
violence), the main thing to take away here is that their scope and extension 
is generally seen to increase and widen in a conflictual context.   ISIS’s 
recent rise in the Iraqi-Syrian borderlands needs to be viewed in such a light 
and, indeed, represents something of an oddity in spatial and territorial 
terms.60 
Recent representation of Sykes-Picot suggests that maybe we don’t know 
quite as much as we should about the history of boundaries and borderlands 
in the Middle East.   This tallies nicely with recent observations from 
historians that we have been too fixed on representation and insufficiently 
preoccupied with borderland materialities – that is there is more to say 
about their social and spatial structures and how power has been projected 
and resisted in state margins.61   Since the Perso-Ottoman frontier zone 
(comprising Iran’s contemporary western borderlands with Turkey and Iran) 
constitutes the most obvious material example of a historical borderland in 
the Middle East we’ll say a few words about it here.   We will refer in a later 
section to the ‘paper borderlands’ created by the overlapping territorial 
claims of Saudi Arabia and Yemen in southern Arabia before 2000. For they 
could be viewed as having broadly defined a borderlands legally – if largely 
on paper only (see Figure 3).   
The Perso-Ottoman borderlands constituted a classic frontier zone going 
back to the sixteenth century.  Temporality is key here.  Taking a broad 
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sweep, the loose territorial parameters of this indeterminate zone moved 
east then west as surrounding central authority was never extended on a 
permanent or convincing basis, while its remoteness and unfamiliarity 
provided for localised political autonomy and a relative freedom of socio-
economic movement. 62  This did not mean, however, that for significant 
periods of time – often decades within the centuries under discussion, 
fortified limits did not exist as hard borders within these borderlands.63   
Nonetheless, historically, there was something in that old deterministic role 
claimed for major mountain ranges, with Hubbard’s assessment that the 
Zagros would: “sooner or later… invariably resume its original role as a 
divider of nations”.64   
Of course, that didn’t stop Britain and Russia from trying to narrow this 
frontier into a mappable line from the early 1840s.  Such misplaced, 
grandiose ambition ultimately resulted in a distinctly mid-nineteenth century 
project (in approach and conception) not being discharged until the onset of 
the First World War, late in 1914.  In reckoning that it could establish a basis 
for observing the basis of a boundary with its observation of a status quo 
line in 1843, never mind to suggest that this should be observed on a 
permanent basis looking forward by ‘freezing such a moment in time’65, 
Britain was reducing the complex and dynamic  local organisation of the 
borderlands.  So the most obviously prioritised nineteenth century European 
effort to instil territorial order in the Middle East soon became relegated to 
mapping an indeterminate zone.66  Meanwhile, the exercise was used by the 
Ottomans to extend authority to the borderlands for the first time and by 
Persia to get the best deal they could secure through European involvement 
at a time when they were unlikely to achieve as much through bilateral 
means.67  As for the effect on the borderland populations themselves, “one 
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consequence…was to progressively instil a more developed territorial 
consciousness or defensiveness…, whereby territorial definition itself would 
become an important component of identity and rivalry”.68     
 
RECENT REPRESENTATIONS OF ARABIAN BOUNDARY DYNAMICS 
Territorial instability and conflict in the northern Gulf 
While few observers would point to Iraq’s long-running boundary disputes 
with Iran and Kuwait in the northern Gulf as causes of Saddam Hussein’s 
decisions to invade Iran in September 1980 and Kuwait a decade later during 
August 1990, they were significant contributory factors. As its principal 
territorial architect, Britain had long believed that the constellation of state 
territory in the northern Gulf posed a genuine prospect of conflict69.  Iran 
and Iraq, with the Persians and Ottomans before them, had never managed 
to develop workable arrangements for the Shatt al-Arab ever since that river 
was first nominated as an international boundary in 1847. Meanwhile, a 
vague and ambiguous Iraq-Kuwait boundary delimitation remained 
essentially unchanged in legal terms from its Anglo-Ottoman origins of 1913 
right through to the Iraqi invasion.  Extended academic treatments of the 
evolution of these border questions – and their background role in conflict - 
appeared throughout the 1980s and 1990s, including by this author, based 
on the relevant British primary records70. 
While the case has been made for linkage in the manner by which Iraq’s 
disputes in the northern Gulf operate, the treaty history of each is quite 
distinct.  A momentous package of Iran-Iraq agreements of 1975 introduced 
a thalweg delimitation for the Shatt al-Arab running along the mid-point of 
the main navigable channel (see Figure 4).  Together, they arguably 
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comprised the most sophisticated legal regime ever agreed for a river 
boundary, containing every conceivable safeguard against future dispute 
over alignment and status71.   Yet, within just over half a decade the 
signatories were at war, highlighting that a problematic boundary solved in 
law had not been a regional problem removed. The UN Secretary-General’s 
resolution of the Iraq-Kuwait boundary dispute– supposedly just the 
demarcation of an existing delimitation but, in reality, quite a bit more than 
that – took the best part of three years following Iraq’s invasion of, then 
removal from Kuwait72. 
Right up until 1975 at l ast, a classic spatial imaginary could be deemed to 
exist whereby several British politicians and diplomats (including former 
Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax) believed that Iraq’s limited access to Gulf 
waters constituted a strategic time-bomb.   From the 1930s, its ministers and 
diplomats had been largely persuaded that a triangular operation of 
disputes between Iraq and its neighbours posed a serious threat to regional 
stability and, increasingly from 1970, the thr at of physical conflict.  Its rules 
held that whenever Iran maintained the upper hand in the conduct of the 
Shatt dispute (or materially improved its position there), Iraq would look 
south to Kuwait to compensate73.  After acceding to Iran’s long-standing 
positional demand that the navigation channel of the Shatt al-Arab river be 
shared in 1975, some argued that Iraq might turn its gaze fully on Kuwait to 
address its ‘access problem’.  Intriguingly, Britain’s Ambassador in Baghdad 
“wonder[ed]… whether an Iraqi takeover of Kuwait … would or should 
lead to war”.   And he went further: “Indeed in terms of Western interests… 
is the continued independence of Kuwait really a matter of such great 
moment?” 74 The degree to which these possibilities were being 
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contemplated genuinely surprised.   We all know what happened 15 years 
later. 
And this old imaginary hasn’t been fully extinguished!  The adoption of the 
Shatt dispute as a symbol of inter-state (and indeed, Arab-Persian) rivalry 
has been notable since the Iraqi revolution of July 195875.  The precise 
location of the navigation channel along the Shatt in its southern reaches 
remains a b ne of contention today between Iran and Iraq and is continuing 
to delay a final peace settlement of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. The Iraq-
Kuwait border question still features periodically in contemporary Iraqi, 
even Basrawi politics, as the UN Secretary-General’s treatment of two 
decades back is bemoaned and denigrated by law-makers, politicians and 
clerics. For example, during the summer months of 2011, Iraqi Shi’ite leader 
Muqtada al Sadr led sizeable protests in Basra against Kuwait’s proposed 
development of a new super-port on the eastern shores on Bubiyan Island76.   
Some of the old colonial spatial imaginaries have been adopted in 
contemporary political discourse, far from unusual in postcolonial politics 
and a reminder that, however much we wish it could be, determinism 
cannot be wished away.    
Finalising the Arabian territorial framework 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait provided a severe jolt to what is still a very 
youthful state system along the western Gulf littoral.  It is as well to 
underline that here we have the world’s greatest concentration of 
microstates and hydrocarbons, all within the geographical context of the 
semi-enclosed sea that is the Persian Gulf.  There were still sizeable gaps in 
the Arabian territorial framework moving into the 1990s77 and addressing 
these would soon become the pragmatic focus of Arabian states.  A mixture 
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of security concerns and material incentives would drive the substantial 
progress made in the 1990s towards finalising and regulating the Arabian 
political map.   To accommodate accelerated levels of oil exploration in the 
flat market conditions in the early 1990s, the states of the region generally 
sought to better define their state margins. International boundaries were 
delimited by new treaty settlements (and one inter-GCC dispute 
[Bahrain/Qatar] even went to the Hague for judicial settlement),  the details 
of old ones were released and important positions of principle, policy and 
intent were arrived at institutionally by the GCC that worked for the 
maintenance, entrenchment and (where appropriate) completion of the 
Arabian territorial framework78.   The results were that most Arabian states 
were a lot more confident of their basic territorial definition than they had 
been at the beginning of the decade. 
It was against such a dynamic that the Saudi-Yemeni boundary agreement of 
June 2000 was concluded, albeit somewhat surprisingly at the time.  This 
had been and remains a loaded question as, rather incongruously, a high 
tech and elaborate border fence separates the Rub al Khali in Saudi Arabia 
from a war-torn, disintegrated Yemeni state in the south.  But, of all its 
territorial limits, Saudi Arabia has always been most concerned with its 
southern borders79.   Meanwhile, the traditional mismatch between a 
cultural affinity to Yemeni nationhood and a much more restricted 
allegiance to various Yemeni states and governments – north, south or 
unified, has historically bedevilled efforts by Sana’a to negotiate territorial 
limits with its northern neighbour 80.  The agreement of 2000 introduced a 
boundary line but in far less detailed terms than one might have expected81.  
This had everything to do with a political window of opportunity suddenly 
opening up for the conclusion of a settlement before the technical teams 
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responsible for its conclusion had really thrashed out its exact parameters. It 
became a question of joining the dots thereafter to lay down a line on the 
ground that would later be marked by marble and gold by Saudi Arabia to 
constitute the current border fence82.   
The territorial framework remains to evolve most obviously out in Gulf 
waters but also in some important land sections.   The political map seems 
most confused where Arabian land borders meet the south-western waters 
of the Gulf in the vicinity of the Saudi sovereign land corridor that separates 
Qatar to the north and Abu Dhabi (UAE) to the east83.   The bizarre 1974 
treaty that supposedly defines and regulates the Saudi-UAE boundary 
specifies:  that all of the rights to a transboundary oilfield (30% of which lies 
in the UAE (Zarrara) and 70% of which lies in Saudi Arabia (Shaiba) belong to 
Saudi Arabia; that the kingdom is allowed to erect installations as it wishes 
on islands that don’t even belong to it and, finally;  introduces a delimitation 
that doesn’t square with the coordinates specified in the agreement (see 
Figure 5).  We also are left with a befuddling maritime political geography.  In 
fact, as it stands, the Qatar-Saudi land delimitation continues offshore to 
constitute the Qatar-Abu Dhabi offshore delimitation84.  In time-honoured 
fashion, the border is now symbolising a growing inter-state rivalry between 
Abu Dhabi and Riyadh and the two sides were even involved in a minor naval 
skirmish off Khor al Udaid in March 2010.   
Fencing Arabia 
The increasing number of border fences running through the Arabian 
Peninsula – as with everywhere else – is usually justified by security 
narratives, serving as a powerful and tangible message that the state is 
protecting its public from outside threats.  Equally, it might be viewed as an 
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acknowledgement that many Arabian states, still less than a half-century 
old, have only just territorialised or are still doing so.  Marking the 
boundaries of a state’s newly-evolved and agreed territorial definition is a 
well-established modernist aspiration, after all.  This harks back to de 
Vattel’s famous admonition of 1758: “[t]o remove every subject of discord, 
every occasion for quarrel, one should mark with clarity and precision the 
limits of territories”. 
Arabian border fencing and walling has several aspects to it.  Fortification of 
the Iraq-Kuwait boundary post- UN ruling was explicitly justified as 
exceptional but Saudi Arabia’s border defence systems to the north and 
south now supposedly guard against the chaos of collapsed state authority 
spreading into the kingdom from Iraq and Yemen.  Meanwhile those erected 
by the UAE during the noughties with Oman and by the latter with Yemen 
also had a lot to do with marking new state territorialisation.    The 
structures placed along the 2000 Saudi-Yemen delimitation soon made 
themselves felt on local, established patterns of human circulation at both 
ends of the borderlands and this was long before Yemen’s current malaise.  
Tribes of the Yemeni mashriq used to benefit from social services in the 
south-western Saudi city of Najran, for instance, while some members of the 
traditionally mobile Mahra tribal confederation in the Yemeni north-east 
also used to boast boast of holding Omani, Saudi and UAE passports.85  The 
walls and fences dividing the cities of Buraimi/Al Ain and Habarut 
(Oman/Yemen) owe much, as commented, to territorialisation in its classic, 
modernistic state-building sense – but also to a more localised one of 
protecting and projecting economic interests.86 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Unsurprisingly, there can be no one typical Middle Eastern boundary or 
borderland, even if some haunting images of human suffering appear to 
characterise them in a contemporary context of the collapsed reach of the 
sovereign state in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen and a growing region-wide 
propensity for central authority to wall or fence inter-state limits.  Reflecting 
back on researching Middle Eastern territorial questions, a case could be 
made for arguing that it is perceived regional (including human) security 
contexts that affect how we view borders at various spatial levels and 
represent them.   Whil  certain representations are more readily associated 
with particular regions in specific temporal contexts – territorial definition as 
a factor in conflict (the northern Gulf, 1980-1990) and (in)security and the 
drive for resources fuelling territorialisation (Arabia in the 1990s) – they 
haven’t disappeared.  Though its significance is currently subsumed by more 
pressing territorial concerns, Iraq’s access question has been politicised at 
both the state and local level.  Meanwhile, the Arabian political map remains 
to be finalised on land and offshore in Gulf waters.  Concomitantly, 
governments continue to utilise territorial and boundary questions as 
political symbols of regional and inter-state rivalries.  If the Lower Gulf 
islands dispute has displaced the Shatt al-Arab’s traditional role in the 
former regard, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have adopted their rather bizarrely 
defined boundary in the latter capacity. 
The emergence of new power spatialities in the marginal areas of the 
fragmented states of Iraq and Syria has, to an extent, highlighted the fact 
that we don’t always know a great deal about the historical materialities of 
borderlands.  There is clear scope for increased research into the way these 
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areas operate – contemporaneously and historically – and recent strides 
made in the elucidation, for instance, of the concepts of borderscapes and 
border biographies offer room for encouragement here.  Despite the current 
questioning of the Sykes-Picot system of colonially-defined territories, it 
would be something of a surprise if the territorial framework was 
significantly redrawn – at least formally.   
Nevertheless new states have recently emerged.  The 2008-9 Abyei case at 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague began the difficult process 
of drawing boundaries for South Sudan.  Interestingly, the tribunal decided 
that there was insufficient evidence to confirm a former, vaguely-worded 
and uncertainly located provincial boundary as a new international one.  It 
looked instead at other human indicators such as oral history and burial 
mounds in reaching its decision on where this should run87.  Though there 
will be huge challenges area in introducing an operative and viable 
borderlands on the ground, this move of international law is broadly 
encouraging, reminding us that there always existed the possibility of 
defining international boundaries in the Middle East that were more identity 
and allegiance based.  When estimating the boundaries of Kuwait in 1908, 
the Government of India’s resident Gulf historian J.G. Lorimer, commented 
that these were “…fluctuating and…are, at any given time, the limits of the 
tribes which then, either voluntarily or under compulsion, owe allegiance to 
the Shaikh of Kuwait”.88  This was ultimately not the route chosen for 
drawing the Arabian territorial framework but greater recognition of human 
movement, needs and vulnerabilities will hopefully be more prominent in 
the future fine-tuning and management of Middle Eastern borders.    
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